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GUBERNATORIAL POWER AND THE 
NATIONALIZATION OF STATE POLITICS 
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 THAD KOUSSER AND JUSTIN H. PHILLIPS, THE POWER OF AMERICAN GOVERNORS: 
WINNING ON BUDGETS AND LOSING ON POLICY (2012). Pp. 296. Hardcover $25.94. 
 
Governors, the late Alan Rosenthal argued, have the “best job in politics.”1 For po-
litical entrepreneurs looking to influence policy and establish a national reputation, there 
appear few better venues to do so. In my home state of Wisconsin, for example, Gover-
nor Scott Walker has emerged as a possible candidate for the 2016 Republican presiden-
tial nomination after winning on several controversial policy proposals and surviving a 
subsequent recall election.2 On the other side of the ideological divide, Democratic gov-
ernors such as Maryland’s Martin O’Malley and New York’s Andrew Cuomo have 
achieved liberal policy successes, catapulting them into the national limelight.3 Mean-
while, parties and interest groups devote more resources than ever to influence guberna-
torial races. In 2010 alone, when thirty-seven governors’ seats were on ballots across the 
United States, the total cost of gubernatorial elections exceeded $920 million.4 
These important political actors are the subject of two impressive new books that 
use different approaches to examine governors’ power and influence. In his book, How 
Governors Built the Modern American Presidency, Saladin Ambar develops a rich his-
torical narrative to argue that the emergence of powerful Progressive Era governors in-
fluenced the establishment of the modern American presidency.5 Thad Kousser and Jus-
tin H. Phillips’s The Power of American Governors: Winning on Budgets and Losing on 
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Policy employs a wide array of methods to tease out the conditions under which contem-
porary governors are empowered and constrained.6 While both books focus specifically 
on governors, both correctly emphasize that studying governors can reveal insights about 
the nature of executive power more broadly. Ambar is more explicit in this regard, fram-
ing his narrative on a claim that the exercise of chief executives’ power in the states 
helped influence the shape of executive power on the national level.7 While the connec-
tion is more implicit throughout Kousser and Phillips’s work, one of the authors’ stated 
goals is to convince scholars to “examine governors as part of a wider research agenda 
on executive power.”8 
In this sense, both books are part of a welcome trend emphasizing that the study of 
the American states can teach us much about broader developments in American politics. 
This is partly because, as Sanford Levinson remarked in reference to America’s fifty 
state constitutions, the states contain a “treasure trove of material in front of our very 
eyes,” allowing scholars to examine greater variation than focusing on national politics 
alone.9 As Kousser and Phillips similarly put it, American federalism provides a “great 
research design opportunity” that scholars and students of national politics ought not to 
ignore.10 
More fundamentally, the scholarly separation of “state” and “national” politics has 
become increasingly untenable for another reason. Politics since the New Deal, as E.E. 
Schattschneider noted, has become increasingly nationalized as the issues political par-
ties contested has shifted from the local to the national scale.11 The nationalization of 
state politics has become even more apparent in the decades since Schattschneider made 
this argument in 1960. Several scholars, for example, have argued that previously sharp 
cultural differences across the states have since receded.12 New federal social policies 
adopted in the 1960s and 1970s explicitly incorporated the states into the operation of 
federal programs, granting state actors both greater interest and ability to help shape na-
tional policy.13 National advocacy groups, such as the conservative American Legisla-
                                                          
6 THAD KOUSSER & JUSTIN H. PHILLIPS, THE POWER OF AMERICAN GOVERNORS: WINNING ON BUDGETS AND 
LOSING ON POLICY 22-25 (2012). 
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AMBAR, supra note 5, at 8. 
 8. KOUSSER & PHILLIPS, supra note 6, at 8. 
 9.  Sanford Levinson, America's “Other Constitutions”: The Importance of State Constitutions for Our 
Law and Politics, 45 TULSA L. REV. 813, 816 (2011). 
 10.  KOUSSER & PHILLIPS, supra note 6, at 8. 
 11.  E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 89 (1960). 
 12.  E.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC 
COMPROMISE 152 (2008); ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF 
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313 (Anita L. Allen & Milton C. Regan, Jr. eds., 1998). 
 13.  This was particularly true of health care and environmental policy, which Congress built upon a frame 
of cooperative federalism in which states and the federal government shared responsibility for policy imple-
mentation. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 
1197-98 (1995) (describing the operation of cooperative federalism in American environmental policy); Nicole 
Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 436-53 (2011) (describing the development of 
the federal-state partnership in the Medicaid program). 
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tive Exchange Council, have looked to the states as opportunity points to spread policy 
ideas across the nation in a coordinated fashion.14 
These developments have meant that state politics have increasingly become an 
extension of larger national policy battles. This makes the study of “state politics” a prac-
tical necessity for anyone interested in understanding national politics. Given that gover-
nors increasingly seek to engage in a broader national debate about policy—with the 
helpful side benefit, of course, of introducing themselves to a national audience—books 
such as Ambar’s and Kousser and Phillips’s contain much of interest even to those out-
side the subfield of “state politics.” 
As mentioned earlier, Ambar’s book is explicit about linking together develop-
ments in state and national politics.15 His central claim is that governors “built a set of 
practices and theories that ultimately shaped presidential behavior and, indeed, made ac-
ceptable a broad executive-centered approach to governance in America.”16 Governors 
as early as Samuel Tilden and Rutherford B. Hayes, who ran against one another in the 
1876 presidential race, pursued a new understanding of executive power that included a 
deep belief in executive-centered government and willingness to push the envelope on 
executive power.17 Subsequent Progressive Era governors developed this understanding, 
becoming more aggressive in taking on new leadership roles within their parties and in-
stitutionalizing more effective press and media relations.18 As governors began develop-
ing a more robust vision of their executive role, they were no longer “little more than ci-
phers,” as James Madison described early American governors, but instead powerful and 
nationally influential actors.19 
Ambar claims that governors’ national influence stemmed from their influence on 
the way modern presidents understood executive power.20 Part of this influence was re-
lated to the sheer number of governors during the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies who ended up in the White House.21 Between Hayes and Franklin Roosevelt, 
“presidents were twice as likely to have had prior elective executive experience” as earli-
er presidents from Washington to Grant.22 While in national office, several of these gov-
ernor-presidents relied upon aggressive uses of executive power that they had already 
used in their governorships, such as extensive use of the veto and challenges to powerful 
legislators’ claims to party leadership.23 Gubernatorial actions also served as inspiration 
for presidents and fellow governors, as when President Woodrow Wilson borrowed Wis-
consin Governor Robert La Follette’s symbolic gesture of communicating his annual 
                                                          
14. Mike McIntire, Conservative Nonprofit Acts as Stealth Business Lobbyist, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/us/alec-a-tax-exempt-group-mixes-legislators-and-
lobbyists.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
15 AMBAR, supra note 5, at 8. 
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Id. at 8-9. 
18 Id. at 4.  
 19.  Id. at 22. 
20 Id. at 8. 
21 Id.  
 22.  Id.  
23 Id. at 10-11. 
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message in person directly to the legislature.24 
The book’s case studies provide a rich account of the burgeoning power of gover-
nors throughout the Progressive Era. While other governors such as La Follette and 
Grover Cleveland receive attention, the three central case studies focus on the New York 
governorships of Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin Roosevelt, as well as Woodrow Wil-
son’s tenure as New Jersey’s chief executive. The historical narrative traces how these 
entrepreneurs expanded executive power through encounters such as Wilson’s intraparty 
fight with New Jersey Democratic boss James Smith25 and Theodore Roosevelt’s shep-
herding the Ford franchise tax bill through the New York legislature.26 Students and 
scholars will learn much from these case studies, particularly since these policy entrepre-
neurs’ intriguing political maneuverings as governors are so frequently overlooked rela-
tive to their later accomplishments as presidents. 
Beyond his interesting historical narrative, one of the strengths of Ambar’s book is 
his weaving of broader political trends in American politics into his study of the growth 
of gubernatorial influence. He discusses how the emergence of “a society without a 
core”27 during the period after Reconstruction, driven in part by the alienating effects of 
rapid industrialization, led to new calls for plebiscitary leadership.28 Skilled governors 
took advantage of this state of affairs by fashioning themselves as tribunes of the people, 
much as modern presidents began to do during this period.29 By showing that governors 
were expanding executive power even before the start of the Progressive Era, Ambar 
provides a convincing retort to the suggestion, made most famously by Arthur Schle-
singer in The Imperial Presidency, that the expansion of presidential power in the twen-
tieth century was primarily a product of the president’s wartime and foreign policy pow-
ers.30 Instead, Ambar illustrates that the expansion of executive influence began well 
before the institutionalization of presidents’ wide claims of wartime powers. 
My intuition is that Ambar’s claims about the influence of gubernatorial power on 
the development of the modern presidency are correct. Overall, however, the book falls a 
bit short of fully demonstrating the bold claim of its title. Most importantly, while Ambar 
documents important changes in executive leadership occurring on both the state and na-
tional level during the Progressive Era, it is not clear whether the changes on the national 
level resulted from, as opposed to simply being contemporaneous with, developments on 
the state level. Would the modern presidency have failed to emerge without the actions 
of innovative governors on the state level? 
Ambar’s central claim appears predicated on this being true. Yet it seems more 
plausible that the growth of the modern presidency relied not on a “bottom-up federal-
ism” in which new ideas diffused from the states to the national level, but rather from 
                                                          
 24.  Id. at 39. 
25 AMBAR, supra note 5, at 87-93. 
26
 Id. at 60-63. 
 27.  ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 12 (1967). 
28 AMBAR, supra note 5, at 21-23. 
29 Id. at 23. 
 30.  ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY viii-ix (1973). 
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broader trends that simultaneously affected executive leadership across all levels of gov-
ernment. If this is true, it would be more accurate to say that what really built the modern 
American presidency was the same public demand for “[e]nergy in the executive”31 eve-
rywhere that could be used to counter inaction in other branches of government. This in-
terpretation seems the most likely when one considers other developments on the state 
level at the time. Other independently elected state-level executives faced intense public 
pressure to confront emerging issues during the Progressive Era, such as the rise of cor-
porate trusts, and many used their offices in innovative ways to react to public demand.32 
Ambar himself notes how “the prerogatives of the new American executive were evident 
in a variety of venues,” providing the example of newly elected New York City Mayor 
Robert Van Wyck’s “invocation of an executive zeitgeist” in 1898.33 
Ambar provides several tantalizing hints of the unique influence governors had on 
the development of modern presidents’ expansive claims of executive authority. For ex-
ample, he presents evidence that “though governor-presidents make up less than 40 per-
cent of all presidents, they account for a surprising 64 percent of all presidential ve-
toes.”34 This suggests that governor-presidents did learn from their previous experience 
as their states’ chief executives. He also provides a good discussion of how Herbert 
Croly, whose The Promise of American Life35 is often credited with influencing Theo-
dore Roosevelt, himself “drew inspiration for his model of executive politics from Amer-
ica’s early twentieth-century governors.”36 Gubernatorial actions during this time bol-
stered Croly’s argument that his conception of executive authority already had a lineage 
in American politics.37 
While these aspects of Ambar’s narrative help build the case that something was 
special about Progressive Era governors, Ambar might have bolstered his argument 
about the uniqueness of gubernatorial influence by closely examining the presidencies of 
those without previous experience as governors. Did presidents with different back-
grounds, such as Benjamin Harrison and William Howard Taft, use their executive pow-
er in a fundamentally different way than the governor-presidents? Did Herbert Hoover 
have a more limited conception of executive power because he did not previously serve 
as governor? Given the centrality of Ambar’s argument that “presidential background 
matters,”38 consideration of how non-governor presidents treated the executive power at 
their disposal would be a particularly fruitful inquiry. 
                                                          
 31.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961). 
 32.  See generally, Paul Nolette, Litigating the “Public Interest” in the Gilded Age: Common Law Business 
Regulation by Nineteenth-Century State Attorneys General, 44 POLITY 373 (2012) (discussing the role of state 
attorney generals during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and how they pursued a public inter-
est by seeking injunctions against businesses and even corporate dissolution through public nuisance and quo 
warranto theories). 
 33.  AMBAR, supra note 5, at 56. 
 34.  Id. at 34-35. 
 35.  See HERBERT DAVID CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE (1909). 
  
36. AMBAR, supra note 5, at 50. 
37 Id. at 51.  
 38.  Id. at 10. 
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It would have also been beneficial to get a stronger sense of the relative influence 
of formal versus informal sources of power on the expansion of gubernatorial authority. 
This is particularly important given that informal power is a cornerstone of the modern 
presidency.39 At several points in the narrative, Ambar emphasizes the importance of 
formal gubernatorial powers contained in state constitutions.40 Early on, for example, he 
suggests that states often “took the lead in recasting legislative-executive relations” be-
cause state constitutions were easier to amend than the federal constitution.41 “Hudson 
Progressives” play such a crucial role in his narrative partly because New York gover-
nors like Samuel Tilden had much more formal authority than governors in other 
states,42 and New Jersey’s Constitution granted its governors, such as Woodrow Wilson, 
more power relative to those elsewhere.43 
It is not clear how much these formal constitutional powers really mattered in the 
development of new conceptions of executive authority, however. Ambar describes 
many other instances of governors relying upon other resources, such as patronage op-
portunities, media influence, and informal claims of authority, to build executive pow-
er.44 Perhaps most strikingly, as Ambar recounts, Woodrow Wilson announced during 
his campaign for governor that he would act as “an unconstitutional Governor” by using 
his informal executive powers to the fullest.45 Ambar might have probed a bit deeper to 
examine the sources of gubernatorial authority, which could bolster his argument that 
there really was something distinctive about the influence of American governors.46 In 
other words, did governors rely upon distinct characteristics of their offices to develop 
new conceptions of executive authority, or is the nature of executive authority so open-
ended that political entrepreneurs in any executive office will find ways to push their 
prerogative as far as it will go? 
While these points might have been fleshed out a bit more, this book is an im-
portant advance in the understanding of executive power. Students and scholars alike 
will find it a good read brimming with many insights and rich historical detail. Perhaps 
most importantly, Ambar’s book serves as a fine addition to recent scholarly trends seek-
ing to break down the too-sharp distinction between “state politics” on the one hand and 
“national politics” on the other. 
Much like How Governors Built the Modern American Presidency, Kousser and 
Phillips’s book portrays governors as influential political actors. The Power of American 
Governors has a contemporary focus, ambitiously tackling several questions pertaining 
to the power of modern governors. How do governors, who lack any formal constitution-
al power to craft legislation, nevertheless respond to public demands for policy leader-
                                                          
 39.  See RICHARD NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP 179 (1960). 
40 AMBAR, supra note 5, at 35, 54, 76.  
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. at 29-30. 
 43.  Id. at 76. 
44 Id. at 4.  
 45.  Id. at 80. 
46 Id. at 6-7.  
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ship?47 Under what conditions are governors most likely to succeed and when are they 
most likely to fail?48 One of the book’s central findings is that, in contrast to other schol-
arly accounts that emphasize gubernatorial weakness by pointing to the many formal 
constraints on governors, “governors do play a key role in shaping state fiscal and policy 
choices.”49 
While the link between state and national politics is not as explicit in this book as 
in Ambar’s, the authors rightly claim that the study of governors can help reveal much 
about the nature of executive power.50 Perhaps most centrally, they illustrate the relative 
irrelevance of formal executive authority as compared to other determinants of executive 
power. While a common scholarly practice is to distinguish “strong governors” and 
“weak governors” on the basis of formal powers granted to governors by their state con-
stitutions, Kousser and Phillips demonstrate that this distinction fails to capture the most 
important variations in gubernatorial power.51 
Instead, the authors “find that the power of chief executives often depends more on 
each governor’s political circumstances and resources than on the formal powers dele-
gated by the state constitution.”
their continued exis
52 The structure of institutions matters for executive 
power—but not in the way you might think. In fact, the authors find that “one of the 
strongest determinants of gubernatorial power lies outside of the executive branch alto-
gether—the professionalization of the legislature.”53 Professional legislatures, which 
meet full-time and consist of members whose position in the legislature is a full-time job, 
are able to engage in considerable political bargaining with the governor. By contrast, 
part-time citizen legislators can literally not afford to endure multiple rounds of negotia-
tions with the governor, since most have second jobs to which they must return at the 
conclusion of their (often sharply time-limited) legislative sessions. Kousser and Phillips 
repeatedly find that this lack of legislative patience on the part of non-professionalized 
legislatures empowers the governor in negotiations, particularly when it comes to budget 
policy.54 While citizen legislatures might retain some romantic appeal by providing a 
“people’s check”55 against governors and their professional staffs, t-
ence in several jurisdictions actually serves to empower the governor.56 
This is not to say, however, that gubernatorial success is entirely reliant on struc-
ture outside of the governor’s control. Governors have agency, and how they use it can 
help determine their ultimate success. Aspiring governors should take note of the au-
                                                          
47 KOUSER & PHILLIPS, supra note 6, at 2.  
48 Id. at 3. 
 49.  Id. at 19.  
50Id. at 6. 
51 Id. at 254.  
 52.  Id. at 24.  
 53.  Id. at 6.   
54 Id. at 226-33.  
 55.  Id. at 220. 
56. As the authors recount, this “people's check” argument was one of the ultimately unsuccessful arguments 
against legislative professionalization in California during the 1960s. Id. at 219-20.   
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thors’ finding that a key determinant of success is to begin with a manageable agenda.57 
While public demands for policy leadership and the governor’s own ambitions may 
tempt a newly elected governor to seek many policy goals, the authors find that gover-
nors who limit the size of their agendas to only a few key items are more likely to 
achieve them.58 Further, and probably not surprisingly, governors who are willing to 
temper the ideological tenor of their policy proposals are more likely to succeed.59 By 
contrast, governors who would benefit from a large “position-taking bonus” by pursuing 
more ideological proposals—such as governors with an eye to the White House—are 
less likely to achieve policy success.60 
Among the book’s many strengths is its reliance on a remarkable array of methods 
to probe the extent of gubernatorial power. Throughout the text, the authors employ 
game theory, quantitative analysis, case studies, and extensive interviews with major 
statehouse players from various states. At the heart of their analysis are two original da-
tasets, one of which includes the fates of over one thousand policy and budget proposals 
made by several governors in their State of the State addresses, and a second that in-
cludes governors’ budget proposals and final budget outcomes across twenty-one fiscal 
years.61 This data, along with the authors’ command of sophisticated methods, enables 
the authors to make considerable advances in our understanding of gubernatorial power. 
To be sure, some of the authors’ findings are not entirely surprising. Few readers 
will be shocked to learn that governors tend to be less successful when members of the 
opposite party control the legislature, or that the largest factor contributing to the ideo-
logical tilt of a governor’s overall agenda is the party in which the governor is a mem-
ber.62 Similarly, while the authors’ discussion of the line-item veto is quite interesting, it 
largely confirms earlier research in finding that the line-item veto does not significantly 
increase gubernatorial power.63 
This is emphatically not to say, however, that readers will fail to learn anything 
new from this book. To the contrary, the authors’ reliance on such a wide range of data 
reveals a great deal of interest to students and scholars. Perhaps the authors’ most im-
portant finding is that “critically different dynamics drive bargaining over the budget and 
over policy bills.”64 The book’s subtitle, “Winning on Budgets and Losing on Policy,” 
somewhat puzzlingly discounts the authors’ findings that governors often do win on pol-
icy, but it nevertheless highlights that governors are the most successful when negotiat-
ing with legislators over the budget.65 The chief reason for this is because in most states, 
                                                          
57 Id. at 129.  
 58.  Id. at 127-29.  
59 Id. at 129.  
 60.  Id. at 125-27. 
61 Id. at 4-5.  
 62.  Id. at 97.  
 63.  Id. at 214.   
 64.    Id. at 3. 
65 Id. at 115. 
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failure to pass a budget “triggers an automatic shutdown of the government.”66 Given the 
negative political consequences of a government shutdown on legislators and the gover-
nor alike, the prospect of this political calamity forces both sides to the bargaining ta-
ble.67 Legislative inaction on the governor’s policy bills, by contrast, means “nothing too 
terrible happens.”68 Rather than triggering an automatic government shutdown, all that 
happens when the legislature fails to enact one of the governors’ policy bills is that it 
maintains the status quo.69 
The authors also help explain why, rather counter-intuitively, governors such as 
Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco and Governor Bob Taft in Ohio were able to 
achieve budgetary and policy successes even as their popularity among their state con-
stituents collapsed.70 By developing innovative “impact scores” that weigh various pro-
posals according to their overall policy impact,71 the authors explain that unpopular gov-
ernors like Blanco and Taft were able to secure successes because they acted 
strategically by scaling back their agendas to be far less ambitious.72 The authors present 
numerous other interesting findings as well—indeed too many to give justice to in this 
review. 
The authors cover so much ground in this book that it is largely unfair to expect 
much more. That said, I was not entirely convinced by their analysis of the differing dy-
namics underlying the governors’ budget versus policy negotiations. On policy, they ar-
gue that governors face institutional constraints that serve to limit their power.73 To 
achieve policy success, governors must shape their policy proposals strategically in light 
of institutional arrangements largely outside of their control, particularly the ideological 
proclivities of the legislature. By contrast, the authors claim, governors have much more 
agency in developing their budget proposals.74 Because the legislature must come to the 
negotiating table to pass a budget ever year, it cannot ignore “unreasonable” gubernatori-
al proposals in the same way it can with policy.75 “Simply put, governors do not need to 
be strategic when formulating their fiscal agendas.”76 
However, the assumption that governors enjoy nearly complete control over their 
budget proposals overlooks how budgets are themselves institutions that shape the gov-
ernor’s bargaining circumstances. When governors develop their annual budget pro-
posals, they do so based upon the existing structure of previous years’ budgets—budgets 
that they may have had no control in developing. Deviations from this existing structure 
                                                          
66 Id. at 31.  
67 Id.  
 68.  Id. at 30.  
69Id.  
70 Id. at 174-86.  
71 Id. at 111.  
 72.  Id. at 186-87. 
73 Id. at 31-33.  
74 Id. at 118.  
75 Id. at 118.   
 76.  Id. at 90.   
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are typically incremental rather than substantial, especially since existing budget pro-
grams already have built-in constituencies willing to defend the status quo. In this sense, 
budgets are similar to other durable institutions defined in part by their resistance to 
change. By contrast, when developing policy proposals, governors work from a cleaner 
slate than they do with the budget. Because they are not working off an existing tem-
plate, governors would appear freer to ask for their sincere preferences on policy rather 
than the budget. This different institutional dynamic would help explain the authors’ 
seemingly surprising finding that Republican and Democratic governors tend to propose 
very similar budgets even as their policy proposals differ considerably.77 While the au-
thors suggest that this reflects ideological flexibility on the part of governors,78 it seems 
more likely that this is because governors’ budget preferences are limited by the existing 
state budget structure. 
The authors might have also placed more emphasis on the broader implications of 
their study. At several points in the book, and especially in the conclusion, the authors 
suggest that the study of governors can teach us much about politics more broadly.79 
This is certainly correct, but the authors might have made more of this point. It is true, as 
they state, that scholars can benefit from taking advantage of the research opportunities 
offered by wide variation in the states.80 This methodological focus, however, partially 
obscures one of the major substantive contributions of the book, which, like Ambar’s, 
illustrates that the study of the states’ chief executives can reveal much about the exer-
cise of executive power generally. For one, the book demonstrates that understanding 
executive power requires close examination of the broader institutional relationships in 
which it is situated. This focus on inter-branch relationships parallels important works 
examining other institutions, such as studies of how judges and justices act strategically 
in reaction to other branches and how conflicts between the president and Congress gen-
erate new avenues for litigation to influence politics.81 By placing their study in this 
broader context, and perhaps including a separate discussion of the broader nature of ex-
ecutive power and how gubernatorial power fits into it, the argument that scholars even 
outside of “state politics” ought to pay attention to governors might have been made 
more explicit. 
These are relatively minor quibbles, however. Kousser and Phillips’s work is a ma-
jor advance in our understanding of gubernatorial power. This is due not only to their 
impressive data collection but their recognition that understanding executive power 
                                                          
77 Id. at 144, 152.  
78 Id. at 144.  
79 Id. 256-57.  
80 Id. at 256. 
81. See generally JEB BARNES, DUST UP: ASBESTOS LITIGATION AND THE FAILURE OF COMMONSENSE POLICY 
REFORM (2011) (discussing the interactions between Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court regarding 
asbestos reform); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) (exploring how the de-
cisions made by the Supreme Court are a result of strategic interactions among the justices and between the 
Court and other branches of government); SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND 
PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE UNITED STATES (2010) (examining how the conflicts between legislative and exec-
utive preferences encourages Congress to rely upon private litigation for statutory implementation). 
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means looking beyond its formal characteristics to examine how this power is embedded 
in a complex web of institutional relationships that help it expand and contract. 
 
* * * 
Some fifty years ago, Richard Neustadt famously noted that the American Consti-
tution created not “separated powers,” but rather a system of “separated institutions shar-
ing powers.”82 While Neustadt’s formulation is widely quoted and seemingly accepted 
as part of the scholarly conventional wisdom, the study of politics nevertheless remains 
highly fragmented. The American Political Science Association, for example, by last 
count listed forty-four separate organized sections such as “Legislative Studies,” “Presi-
dents and Executive Politics,” and “State Politics and Policy.”83 However practically 
necessary this scholarly separation might be it threatens to obscure a deeper understand-
ing of how politics actually work. Politics between the levels of America’s Federalist 
structure has become increasingly blended, driven by developments in national social 
policy, political party development, and the nationalization of issues, culture, and atti-
tudes throughout America’s many jurisdictions. What happens in Vegas does not stay in 
Vegas, at least for the purposes of contemporary American politics. This makes it all the 
more important for scholars across subfields to turn their attention to the states. By 
providing fresh perspectives on how governors exercise executive power, the books by 
Ambar and Kousser and Phillips help demonstrate the importance of state politics to the 
broader understanding of American politics.84 
 
                                                          
 82.  NEUSTADT, supra note 39, at 33. 
 83.  Organized Sections, AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N, 
http://www.apsanet.org/sections/index.cfm?CFID=21911048&CFTOKEN=70055392 (last visited Aug. 20, 
2013). 
84 See generally AMBAR, supra note 5; KOUSSER & PHILLIPS, supra note 6. 
